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Abstract 
This research note examines the conditions which will induce a prospect theory type 
investor, whose reference level is set by ‘playing it safe’, to invest in a risky asset. The 
conditions indicate that this type of investor requires a large equity premium to invest in risky 
assets. However, once she does invest because of a large risk premium, she becomes 
aggressive and buys/sells till an externally imposed upper/lower bound is reached. 
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1 Introduction
Although many households hold risky assets in today’s environment there is still
a sizeable amount who do not own stocks (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). The ex-
pected utility model developed by von Neumann-Morgenstern cannot provide an ad-
equate explanation as to why households do not participate in the market given the
large equity premium in stock markets (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Barberis et al.,
2001). Haliassos and Bertaut argue that explanations such as habit persistence, non-
expected utility, market incompleteness due to uninsurable income risks and quantity
constraints on borrowing are insufficient to explain this phenomenon.
Our note uses the prospect theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
to provide an explanation for the non-investment in risky assets.1 We find that a
prospect theory type of investor who uses as a reference level ‘what she can earn by
playing it safe’2 will not invest in a risky asset as long as the expected excess return
(risk premium) is within a certain threshold range. The thresholds depend on the
degree of loss aversion amongst other parameters. The individual will not invest in
a risky asset except if the risk premium exceeds a threshold level. Furthermore, the
investor will not take a short position except if the risk premium is below another
threshold level. Thus the assumption that the expected excess return is positive, as
was often assumed in risk aversion expected utility models, is not a sufficient condition
for the household to purchase risky investment. Finally, if the expected excess return
exceeds the threshold levels then the household will engage in aggressive risky activity
demanding infinite leverage to purchase or short sell the risky asset. The note proceeds
as follows: In section 2 we present the basic model and investigate the main result of
the paper and section 3 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Portfolio decisions with loss aversion
Consider an investor who is deciding to allocate initial wealth, W1 > 0, toward a risk
free investment in the amount of m and a risky investment in the amount of a. The
1See also Gomes (2005). We generalize results and incorporate the possibility of a negative
expected excess return.
2I.e., comparison to an event when the household invests only in a risk free asset.
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safe asset yields a net of the dollar investment return r > 0 and two states of nature
determine the return of the risky asset, x ∈ {xg, xb}. In the good state of nature, the
risky asset yields a net of the dollar investment return xg > 0 with probability p and
in the bad state of nature it yields xb with probability 1− p. Furthermore, the rates
of returns of the two assets are assumed to be such that xb < r < xg.
The terminal wealth W2i is determined as
W2b = [(1 + r) + (xb − r)α]W1, x = xb
W2g = [(1 + r) + (xg − r)α]W1, x = xg
}
(1)
where α = a
W1
is the proportion of initial wealth invested in the risky asset. We
assume also that the risky proportion is within the interval αL ≤ α ≤ αU for final
wealth to be non-negative where3
αL = −
1 + r
xg − r
and αU =
1 + r
r − xb
(2)
The investor maximizes a typical Kahneman Tversky loss averse utility function
given as follows4
ULA(W2 − Γ) =
{
UG(W2 − Γ) =
(W2−Γ)1−γ
1−γ
, W2 ≥ Γ
λUL(W2 − Γ) = −λ
(Γ−W2)1−γ
1−γ
, 0 ≤W2 < Γ
}
where Γ is a reference wealth. The γ parameter determines the curvature of the
utility function for relative gains and losses. We assume that γ ∈ (0, 1) in order to
be consistent with the experimental findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The
λ > 1 is a loss aversion parameter which captures the fact that investors are more
sensitive when they experience an infinitesimal loss in financial wealth than when
experiencing a similar size relative gain. It is easy to see that in the domain W2 ≥ Γ
the investor displays risk aversion, while in the domain of losses the investor is a risk
lover. The reference wealth level is set at a level of ‘playing it safe’ when all wealth
3This can be an exogenously imposed limit on investment or short-selling. In this note we do not
explore the foundations of such limits on investment.
4See Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Gomes (2005), and He and Zhou (2011) for similar utility
functions.
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is invested in the risk free asset
Γ = (1 + r)W1 (3)
Thus, based on (1)-(3) the relative wealth is
W2 − Γ =
{
(xb − r)W1α, x = xb
(xg − r)W1α, x = xg
and the investor solves the following problem
Maxα : E(ULA(W2 − Γ))
such that : W2i − Γ = (xi − r)W1α
αL ≤ α ≤ αU

 (4)
To proceed with the analysis we define the following two thresholds
Z1 ≡
[
λ
1
1−γ
(
1− p
p
) γ
1−γ
− 1
]
(1− p)(r − xb) (5)
Z2 ≡
[(
1
λ
) 1
1−γ
(
1− p
p
) γ
1−γ
− 1
]
(1− p)(r − xb) (6)
It is easy to show that Z1 > Z2 for λ > 1. Proposition 1 states the solution to (4).
Proposition 1 It is optimal for a prospect theory type investor not to invest in the
risky asset as long as the risk premium (expected excess return) is within the interval
Z2 < E(x− r) < Z1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 The condition E(x − r) < Z1 is equivalent to λ > 1/Kγ, where Kγ =
(1−p)(r−xb)
1−γ
p(xg−r)1−γ
. On the other hand the condition E(x−r) > Z2 is equivalent to λ > Kγ.
5
5Kγ showing the attractiveness of short selling the risky asset, while the inverse 1/Kγ shows the
attractiveness of investing in the risky asset and coincides with the loss averse thresholds used in He
and Zhou (2011).
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Corollary 2 If E(x − r) > Z1 then the investor will continue investing all of her
initial wealth into the risky asset until α∗ = αU , while if E(x − r) < Z2 then the
investor will continue to short sell the risky asset until α∗ = αL < 0.
There are two problems to consider as shown in the Appendix. First, if α ≥ 0 the
household will gain in the good state of nature and suffer losses in the bad state as in
(P1) in the Appendix. Because the investor is loss averse, λ > 1, the marginal rate of
substitution of increasing wealth in the good state in terms of accepting a reduction in
wealth occurring in the bad state of nature, while holding utility constant, depends
negatively on the loss aversion. Under (P1) the marginal rate of substitution is∣∣∣ d(W2b−Γ)d(W2g−Γ) |dE(ULA(W2−Γ))=0
∣∣∣ = p(1−p) 1λ ( r−xbxg−r
)γ
. It is easy to show that the investor’s
marginal rate of substitution will be lower than the market trade-off for wealth in the
good state relative to the bad state of nature as indicated by the slope of the budget
line
∣∣∣ d(W2b−Γ)d(W2g−Γ) |dW2=0
∣∣∣ = r−xbxg−r , if E(x − r) < Z1. Hence investor will reduce the risky
investment to increase utility. On the other hand, if E(x− r) > Z1 then the investor
will keep on increasing the investment in the risky asset until the boundary αU is
reached.6 Second, if α < 0 then problem (P2) applies. In a similar line of reasoning
if E(x − r) > Z2 then the marginal rate of substitution of wealth between good and
bad state of nature,
∣∣∣ d(W2b−Γ)d(W2g−Γ) |dE(ULA(W2−Γ))=0
∣∣∣ = p(1−p)λ( r−xbxg−r
)γ
, is bigger than the
market trade-off between wealth in the good and the bad state of nature, and the
investor will reduce her short selling activity to increase utility.
Hence when preferences follow prospect theory, and the reference point is as de-
scribed above, the optimal solution yields no investment in the risky asset when the
risk premium is within the above boundary. The risk premium has to be above a
threshold level Z1 for investment in the risky asset to occur. If the risk premium is
below Z1 then the optimum investment is either zero or αL < 0. In order to eliminate
short selling from the solution one needs to impose E(x−r) ≥ Z2 instead of imposing
the condition E(x − r) ≥ 0 which is required in the expected utility. Finally, if the
risk premium is below Z2 then short selling is attractive.
7
These two threshold levels, Z1 and Z2 depend on λ, γ, p, r and xb and could be
positive or negative, but no matter what the sign is, it will always be the case that
6Gomes (2005) introduced risk aversion again in the domain of losses in order to limit the risk
taking activity. We use boundaries which keep final wealth from becoming negative.
7Note that Z2 = 0 when λ =
(
1−p
p
)γ
which happens only for p < 0.5 as λ > 1.
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Z1 > Z2 given λ > 1. In addition, if Z1 ≤ 0 then E(x − r) > 0 will be sufficient
to yield a positive level of risky investment. On the other hand, a positive Z1 value
implies that the assumption E(x− r) > 0 will be not sufficient to cause the investor
to invest in risky assets.
Furthermore as the loss averse parameter increases (decreases) the interval in
which the investor will not invest in the risky asset widens (shrinks) as ∂Z1
∂λ
> 0 and
∂Z2
∂λ
< 0. The sensitivity of Z1 and Z2 to the γ parameter is not that transparent. If
the investor’s loss aversion parameter is sufficiently large, i.e., λ > max
{
p
1−p
, 1−p
p
}
,
then ∂Z1
∂γ
> 0 and ∂Z2
∂γ
< 0 and the zero optimal risky investment interval widens once
again with increasing γ.
Finally, for a sufficiently loss averse prospect theory type investor (i.e., for big
enough λ) Z2 < 0 < Z1. For Z1 to be positive the following condition is required
λ >
(
p
1−p
)γ
. A positive Z1 will definitely be met provided that the good state of
nature is as likely, or less, than the probability of the bad state of nature.8 The Z2
threshold will be negative if λ >
(
1−p
p
)γ
. This condition will always be met provided
that the probability of the good state of nature is as probable, or more, than the bad
state of nature.9 With a negative Z2 the investor may not engage in short selling
even if she expects that the risky asset will yield less than the risk free rate E(x) < r,
i.e., when Z2 < E(x− r) < 0.
In order to illustrate this let’s consider p = 0.5, r = 2%, and assume the stock
return to follow a binomial model with an expected return of 8% and a standard
deviation being equal to 15%. Tables 1 and 2 show some numerical calculations of
Z1 and Z2 by allowing λ to vary between 1.2 and 3, while γ varies between 0 and 0.8.
The bold figures in Table 1 indicate that the investor would buy the risky asset as the
risk premium, E(x − r) = 6%, is above the Z1 threshold. However, experiments in
the literature reveal values of loss aversion in the range of 1.8 to 5 and the curvature
parameter between 0.6 and 0.8 which implies that the household specified by these
parameters and ‘playing it safe’ reference level would require a huge risk premium to
invest in the stock market.10 Had the investor’s preferences be of the expected utility
8However there are cases when Z1 < 0, e.g., when 1 < λ <
(
p
1−p
)γ
and p > 0.5.
9For Z2 > 0 it must be the case that λ <
(
1−p
p
)γ
and p < 0.5. Namely, Z2 > 0 has a higher
chance of occurring if the odds are in favor of a bad state of nature.
10See Abdellaoui et al. (2007) for a literature review on the estimated parameter values.
5
type then the only requirement would be a positive risk premium. On the other hand,
Table 2 implies that the investor would never short sell the risky asset as the risk
premium does not fall below Z2.
λ =1.2 λ =1.8 λ =2 λ =2.25 λ =2.35 λ =3
γ =0.0 0.009 0.036 0.045 0.056 0.061 0.090
γ =0.2 0.012 0.049 0.062 0.079 0.086 0.133
γ =0.4 0.016 0.075 0.098 0.129 0.142 0.236
γ =0.6 0.026 0.151 0.210 0.297 0.336 0.656
γ =0.8 0.067 0.805 1.395 2.550 3.180 10.890
Table 1: Z1 threshold values given E(x− r) = 0.06
λ =1.2 λ =1.8 λ =2 λ =2.25 λ =2.35 λ =3
γ =0.0 -0.008 -0.020 -0.023 -0.025 -0.026 -0.030
γ =0.2 -0.009 -0.023 -0.026 -0.029 -0.030 -0.034
γ =0.4 -0.012 -0.028 -0.031 -0.033 -0.034 -0.038
γ =0.6 -0.016 -0.035 -0.037 -0.039 -0.040 -0.042
γ =0.8 -0.027 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.045
Table 2: Z2 threshold values given E(x− r) = 0.06
3 Conclusion
This note was written in order to explore what conditions will induce a specific
prospect theory type investor whose reference level is set by ‘playing it safe’ to invest
in or short sell a risky asset. Simple illustrative examples indicate that this particular
investor requires a large risk premium to invest in a risky asset but once she does
invest then only legal constraints can stop her investment.
However, an investor with prospect type of preferences will play the stock market
if her reference level will differ from the ‘playing it safe’ level and the risk premium
is positive (see Hlouskova and Tsigaris, 2012). In addition, an investor with lower
degree of loss aversion will not become aggressive and thus will not engage in infinite
leverage.
6
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. At first we re-formulate the statement of proposition 1 in
more detail.
Let W1 > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1), xb > −1, λ > 1, z ≡ x− r, and xb < r < xg. Then problem
(4) obtains its maximum (maxima) α∗ as follows
(a) α∗ = αU for E(z) > Z1
(b) α∗ ∈ [0, αU ] for E(z) = Z1
(c) α∗ = 0 for Z2 < E(z) < Z1
(d) α∗ = αL for E(z) < Z2
(e) α∗ ∈ [αL, 0] for E(z) = Z2
Note that α∗ ≥ 0 for E(z) > Z2.
Based on the domain of α, there are two cases that can occur: 0 ≤ W2b < Γ,
W2g ≥ Γ or W2b ≥ Γ, 0 ≤W2g < Γ. Thus, the corresponding problems we would like
to solve are
Maxα : pUG(W2g − Γ) + (1− p)λUL(W2b − Γ) =
(W1α)1−γ
1−γ
[p(xg − r)
1−γ − λ(1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ]
such that : 0 ≤ α ≤ αU

 (P1)
Maxα : pλUL(W2g − Γ) + (1− p)UG(W2b − Γ) =
(W1(−α))1−γ
1−γ
[−λp(xg − r)
1−γ + (1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ ]
such that : αL ≤ α ≤ 0

 (P2)
Case (a): Note that E(z) > Z1 implies that
p(xg − r)
1−γ − λ(1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ > 0 (A1)
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and thus the utility function of problem (P1) is increasing at its domain. It follows
from (A1) and λ > 1 that
λp(xg − r)
1−γ − (1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ > 0 (A2)
and thus the utility function of problem (P2) is also increasing at its domain. Based
on this and the fact that utility functions of (P1) and (P2) are zeros for α = 0 it
follows that in case (a) the utility E(ULA(W2−Γ)) is increasing function in its domain
and thus α∗ = αU .
Case (b): Note that E(z) = Z1 implies that
p(xg − r)
1−γ − λ(1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ = 0
and thus the utility function of (P1) is constant (namely zero) in its domain. It
follows from this and λ > 1 that λp(xg − r)
1−γ − (1 − p)(r − xb)
1−γ > 0 and thus
the utility function of (P2) is increasing at its domain. Thus, in case (b) the utility
E(ULA(W2 − Γ)) has its maxima in [0, αU ].
Case (c): Let Z2 < E(z) < Z1. Note that E(z) < Z1 implies that
p(xg − r)
1−γ − λ(1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ < 0
and thus the utility function of (P1) is decreasing at its domain. E(z) > Z2 implies
(A2) and thus the utility function of (P2) is increasing at its domain. In summary,
the utility E(ULA(W2 − Γ)) has its maxima at zero, i.e., α
∗ = 0.
Case (d): Note that E(z) < Z2 implies that
λp(xg − r)
1−γ − (1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ < 0
thus the utility function of (P2) is decreasing at its domain. It follows from this and
λ > 1 that p(xg − r)
1−γ − λ(1 − p)(r − xb)
1−γ < 0 and thus the utility function of
(P1) is also decreasing at its domain. The utility E(ULA(W2−Γ)) is then decreasing
function in its domain and reaches its maximum at α∗ = αL.
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Case (e): Note that E(z) = Z2 implies that
λp(xg − r)
1−γ − (1− p)(r − xb)
1−γ = 0
and thus the utility function of (P2) is constant (namely zero) in its domain. It
follows from this and λ > 1 that p(xg − r)
1−γ −λ(1− p)(r−xb)
1−γ < 0 which implies
that the utility function of (P1) is decreasing at its domain. Thus, in case (e) the
utility E(ULA(W2 − Γ)) has its maxima in [αL, 0]. This concludes the proof.
10
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